MENLO SECURITY

EBOOK

How MARS Neutralizes the Agentic Attack Surface

Based on the OWASP GenAI LLM Top 10 2026



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THE FACTS

40%

Gartner expects 40% of enterprise applications to include task-specific AI agents by the end of 2026, up from less than 5% in 2025. This growth will bring substantial business value, but it also changes the nature of the enterprise attack surface.

AI agents are rapidly moving beyond the role of assistants. They can research topics, retrieve information, interact with applications, access enterprise data, and execute multistep workflows with limited human involvement.

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The State of AI Security

A malicious website or file can affect more than the information an agent returns. Agents interpret the content they encounter and use that information to determine what happens next. A hidden instruction embedded in a webpage, document, image, or retrieved data source can influence the agent's reasoning, redirect its goals, or shape how it uses legitimate tools and permissions. Web content becomes an input to software that can act.

OWASP has formalized many of the risks posed by this shift in its guidance on LLM and agentic systems. These include prompt injection, excessive agency, agent goal hijacking, tool misuse, identity and privilege abuse, memory and context poisoning, and sensitive information disclosure. Managing these risks requires controls around both the model and its runtime environment: what content reaches the agent, which resources it can access, what actions it may perform, and what information it can transmit during execution.

Organizations, therefore, need controls that operate at the intersection of external content, agent reasoning, enterprise authority, and sensitive data. Security must inspect what agents consume, govern where they can go and what they can do, and apply data protections before information leaves the controlled workflow.



Menlo Security's **Menlo Agent Runtime Security (MARS)** provides this runtime enforcement layer. It inspects web content for threats and adversarial instructions, sanitizes files before agents consume them, applies policies to agent access, and examines outbound interactions for sensitive data. These controls reduce the opportunity for malicious content to influence an agent and limit the consequences of unsafe behavior while preserving the autonomy that makes agents valuable.

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The Attack Surface Changes When Software Becomes an Actor

When a user, sans-AI, visits a website, there is usually a pause between receiving information and acting on it. The person reads the content, interprets its meaning, assesses its trustworthiness, and decides what to do next. Security controls may influence that decision, but the final step typically remains with the user.

AI agents compress that sequence into an automated workflow. An agent can navigate to a site, retrieve and interpret content, access connected tools or enterprise data, and execute the next step without waiting for a person to evaluate each decision. What the agent consumes can directly influence what it does.

This shift extends the attack surface beyond the model. Risk can emerge at any point in the chain: the content an agent encounters, the reasoning it applies, the identity and privileges it carries, the tools it can invoke, the sensitive data it can access, and the actions it ultimately performs. A failure in one part of that chain can propagate through the rest of the workflow.

WHERE RISK CAN EMERGE

01 Content Encountered

02 Reasoning Applied

03 Identity and Privileges

04 Tools Invoked

05 Sensitive Data Accessed

06 Actions Performed

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The OWASP Top 10

THE RISK	THE ISSUE
Poisoned Content In OWASP ASI01 [Agent Goal Hijack]	Prompt injections hidden within web pages are accessed by the agent as it browses, silently redirecting its goals.
Poisoned Data at Rest OWASP ASI06 [Memory & Context Poisoning]	Files retrieved from internal storage areas (SharePoint, OneDrive, S3) for RAG may contain hidden malware and injection prompts. I.e., trusted source, untrusted content.
Malicious Files & Code OWASP ASI04 [Agentic Supply Chain] · OWASP ASI05 [Unexpected Code Execution]	Malware, exploits, and tampered content may ride across endpoints via downloads, documents, and untrusted websites.
Sensitive Data Exposure OWASP ASI02 [Tool Misuse & Exploitation]	Agents are exposed to sensitive data (PII, PCI, PHI) and source code, sending it to AI models and across the internet via their tools.
Identity & Excess Access OWASP ASI03 [Identity & Privilege Abuse] · OWASP ASI09 [Human-Agent Trust]	Agents inherit broad user privileges, giving them unmonitored access to internal applications and the open web.
Beyond the Web, File, Data, and Access Layer OWASP ASI07 [Insecure Inter-Agent Comms] · OWASP ASI08 [Cascading Failures] · OWASP ASI10 [Rogue Agents-Behavioral]	Agents require intrusive access and baseline trust, which can lead to the necessity of additional security tools.

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The OWASP Top 10 Continued

OWASP's security guidance reflects this distinction. The Top 10 for LLM Applications focuses on risks involving models embedded within larger applications. The Top 10 for Agentic Applications expands the focus to autonomous systems that use tools, maintain context, exercise privileges, and produce consequences outside the model. Risks such as behavior hijacking, tool misuse, and identity and privilege abuse become especially important when a model can translate manipulated input into action.

Microsoft research shows how manipulated input can reach legitimate agent capabilities. Vulnerabilities in Semantic Kernel allowed prompt injection to influence tool parameters and potentially produce host-level remote code execution.

Organizations must evaluate both the content reaching an agent and the actions that content could influence. Once software becomes an actor, every source it consumes can affect a downstream decision, and every permission or tool it possesses can increase the consequences of manipulation.

"Once Software Becomes an Actor, Every Source It Consumes Can Affect a Downstream Decision."

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Agents Are Entering a Web Environment Already Built to Evade Security Controls

AI agents interact with the same websites, SaaS applications, documents, cloud storage, and other online resources that people use every day. That means they inherit the security problems already present across the open web. Malicious content can appear on newly created infrastructure, hide behind evasive techniques, or originate from a website that reputation systems classify as safe. By the time conventional controls detect the threat, a user or agent may already have encountered it.

Menlo Security's browser telemetry illustrates the scale of this problem. During the first quarter of 2026, Menlo documented 52,185 threats launched from sites already classified as safe, 4,937 zero-day attacks stopped before reputation filters recognized them, and 115,842 evasive phishing campaigns designed to bypass legacy detection. These figures represent browser threats observed across enterprise customer environments, establishing the conditions under which agents are now being deployed: a web environment in which trust signals are incomplete and malicious content is often designed to appear legitimate.

This report focuses on the portion of that attack surface where MARS directly operates: the web content, files, data, and access related to agent execution. Other agentic risks, including insecure inter-agent communication, cascading failures, and rogue-agent behavior, require additional controls elsewhere in the AI architecture, typically found within the AI tool itself. MARS addresses the runtime path through which hostile content actually reaches an agent and the sensitive information that is at risk of leaving it.

52,185 Threats launched from sites already classified as safe

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Agent Autonomy Inherits the Risks Present in the Environment the Agent Is Asked to Navigate.

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Agent Goal Hijacking Turns Content Into Instructions

The web gives attackers both a delivery channel and an opportunity to influence how an agent interprets its task.

Attackers can redirect an agent by targeting the information it is expected to consume rather than compromising the underlying model. Instructions can be embedded in webpages, documents, images, metadata, tool responses, and other retrieved content. If the agent cannot reliably distinguish data from instructions, it may incorporate the attacker's content into its reasoning and redirect an otherwise legitimate workflow.

This technique, commonly called indirect prompt injection, can enter through external or internal sources. A document retrieved from SharePoint, OneDrive, Amazon S3, or another approved repository may appear trustworthy because of its storage location. That location says little about the integrity of the content itself. The file could contain hidden prompts, poisoned context, or other malicious elements introduced before the agent retrieves it. A trusted source does not automatically make every object within it safe.



OWASP Identifies Agent Behavior or Goal Hijacking as a Primary Risk for Agentic Applications.

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Agent Goal Hijacking Continued

The danger of prompt injection increases when compromised content is added to a retrieval-augmented generation corpus or written into long-term agent memory. Rather than affecting a single interaction, the malicious instruction can persist and influence subsequent sessions whenever the poisoned material is retrieved. The agent may repeatedly treat the content as relevant context without recognizing that an attacker shaped it.

Hidden instructions make that manipulation particularly difficult for people to catch. A human reviewer and an AI system may process the same source very differently. Mandiant demonstrated this gap during red-team assessments by embedding prompt-injection text in an image rendered at one-by-one pixel dimensions. The content was effectively invisible to the human user but was still parsed and executed by the AI model. From the user's perspective, the workflow appeared normal. From the agent's perspective, the hidden text became an instruction.

Security controls should detect, remove, or neutralize hostile instructions before the agent can interpret them. Model-level safeguards remain valuable, while runtime controls provide an independent layer that can also limit the consequences if an instruction gets through. Together, these controls make goal hijacking harder to initiate and reduce its potential impact.



MENLO AGENT RUNTIME SECURITY

MARS addresses this risk before the content becomes part of the agent workflow. It inspects web content for adversarial intent and sanitizes files the agent retrieves, including material sourced from internal repositories or prepared for RAG. Content Disarm and Reconstruction rebuilds files using known-good elements, leaving behind unsafe objects and hidden content that could carry malicious instructions. This reduces the opportunity for prompt injection to reach the agent intact while preserving the legitimate content the workflow requires.

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Agency Turns Manipulated Intent Into Real-World Action

Agent goal hijacking changes what an agent intends to do. Agency determines how much damage the manipulated intent can cause.

Enterprise agents may be authorized to read files, access business applications, query databases, send messages, transfer content, change records, or execute complete workflows. These capabilities are what make agents useful. They also mean that a successful prompt injection no longer ends with an inaccurate or inappropriate response. The agent may use legitimate permissions to execute the attacker's instructions as real actions.

The tool itself does not have to be malicious. An email function can send information to an unauthorized recipient. A file-transfer capability can move sensitive data outside the organization. A database connector can retrieve records that the agent does not need for its assigned task. Each tool may work exactly as designed while contributing to an unsafe outcome because the intent behind its use has been redirected.

LEGITIMATE TOOLS, REDIRECTED INTENT

Email Function



Sends information to an unauthorized recipient

File-Transfer Capability



Moves sensitive data outside the organization

Database Connector




Retrieves records the agent does not need for its assigned task

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Agency Turns Manipulated Intent Into Real-World Action Continued

The challenge of agent goal hijacking extends across the agent's supporting ecosystem. Agents increasingly depend on third-party tools, Model Context Protocol servers, plugins, external services, and retrieved content. A vulnerable, compromised, or malicious component can influence the workflow even when the underlying model and agent are functioning normally. Trust in an authenticated agent cannot automatically extend to every component it invokes, every response it receives, or every parameter it generates.

Microsoft demonstrated the consequences through vulnerabilities identified in its Semantic Kernel framework. Researchers showed that prompt injection could influence the parameters passed to legitimate tools. In vulnerable configurations, those parameters could enable host-level remote code execution, arbitrary file access, file writes, and potential data exfiltration. In one example, the model interpreted natural language, selected an available tool, and passed data into code as designed. The failure occurred because attacker-influenced input reached a function with dangerous capabilities.



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Govern Authority According to Consequence


OWASP connects the potential impact of agent misuse to the functionality, permissions, and autonomy granted to the agent. The more an agent can access and the more independently it can act, the larger the potential blast radius. A read-only research agent presents one level of risk. An agent that can change configurations, write to production systems, send external communications, or initiate transactions presents another.

Human approval does not eliminate the problem by itself. People may be more inclined to approve an action because it was proposed by an authenticated, enterprise-sanctioned agent. That confidence can obscure the manipulated workflow that produced the request. Authentication establishes the identity of the agent. It does not prove that every action the agent recommends is safe or consistent with the user's original intent.

40%

Gartner predicts that by 2027, 40% of enterprises will demote or decommission autonomous AI agents because governance gaps are discovered only after production incidents. Its guidance points to proportional governance based on an agent's capabilities and the access it receives, rather than treating every agent as either fully trusted or completely restricted.

Agents need enough authority to perform useful work, but that authority should reflect their assigned purpose and potential impact. Security teams must determine which permissions each agent needs, which tools and components it may trust, and what controls remain in place when legitimate access is exercised on manipulated intent.



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Sensitive Data Becomes Part of the Attack Chain

As agents gain authority, sensitive data becomes part of the same attack chain. Agents increasingly work with customer records, internal documents, intellectual property, credentials, financial information, and application data. In many cases, access to that information is necessary for the agent to complete its assigned task.

That legitimate access changes the threat model. When an agent is already permitted to retrieve protected information, an attacker can focus on manipulating how that access is used. The agent may retrieve the data legitimately and then disclose or use it for an unintended purpose.

Disclosure can also occur beyond the agent's final response. Sensitive information may appear in tool arguments, retrieved context, logs, reasoning traces, file transfers, API requests, or communications sent during the workflow. An agent can therefore expose data without displaying it directly to the user.



Where Sensitive Data Can Surface

- Tool Arguments
- Retrieved Context
- Logs
- Reasoning Traces
- File Transfers
- API Requests
- Workflow Communications

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Sensitive Data Risk Continued

Mandiant demonstrated how this could work during an AI red-team assessment. Its researchers created a persistent malicious prompt in a target user's application profile. Whenever that user logged in, the prompt directed the agent to email private information to a destination controlled by the red team. The agent already had access to the data and the ability to send the message. The malicious prompt connected those legitimate capabilities into an unauthorized disclosure path.

Access is only the first decision. Controls must also determine whether the information should leave during a specific interaction, through a particular channel, and for a particular destination.



MENLO AGENT RUNTIME SECURITY

MARS applies that decision at runtime. It identifies sensitive or regulated information as data moves through the workflow, then masks the protected values or prevents the disclosure according to policy. This protects the agent from malicious input while protecting enterprise data from unsafe agent output.

IBM's 2025 Cost of a Data Breach research found a similar gap between AI access and AI governance. Among organizations that reported breaches involving AI models or applications, 97% lacked proper AI access controls. Sixty percent of those AI-related incidents resulted in compromised data.

97%

Lacked proper AI access controls

60%

Of AI-related incidents resulted in compromised data

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Allow-or-Block Controls Miss the Complete Workflow

Traditional access controls tend to evaluate one event at a time. They verify the agent's identity, the destination, the requested tool, and the permissions associated with the data. Each check may return the right answer while the complete workflow still produces an unsafe outcome.

An approved agent may use an approved tool to retrieve information it is authorized to access. It may then contact an allowlisted service and submit a technically valid request. Viewed independently, no single step necessarily appears malicious. The risk emerges from the sequence: what prompted the agent to retrieve the information, how that information was carried into the next action, and where it ultimately went.

Microsoft has identified this gap in MCP tool execution. MCP gives agents a consistent way to discover and invoke tools, but it does not determine whether a specific tool call and its arguments are appropriate within the current interaction. Microsoft also notes that a series of individually permitted calls can combine to form a malicious workflow.

Agentic security must evaluate the runtime interaction connecting these elements. Controls need visibility into the content that influenced the agent, the data involved, the tool being invoked, the destination being contacted, and the action the agent is attempting to complete. Each component must be evaluated within the complete interaction to determine whether the resulting activity remains consistent with policy and the agent's authorized purpose.

EACH CHECK PASSES

Agent identity	ALLOWED
Destination	ALLOWED
Requested tool	ALLOWED
Data permissions	ALLOWED

The Complete Workflow Still Produces An Unsafe Outcome

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Runtime Is Where the Attack Chain Can Be Broken

An agentic attack can move from malicious content to manipulated reasoning, legitimate tool use, and sensitive data exposure. Identity security, application security, and model guardrails each govern part of that sequence, but the interaction connecting them occurs during execution.

Runtime controls provide an enforcement point between the content entering the workflow and the actions and data leaving it. Applied there, policy can interrupt manipulated activity before it produces a harmful outcome.

The Agentic Attack Chain



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Place Enforcement Around the Agent

MARS operates along the runtime path connecting agents to the web, files, applications, and enterprise data. It can inspect the content entering a workflow, sanitize pages and files before the agent processes them, govern the destinations and resources available to each agent, and prevent sensitive information from leaving when the interaction violates policy.

This placement matters because an agent cannot be expected to serve as the final judge of whether its own behavior is safe. The same reasoning process that evaluates a suspicious instruction may already be influenced by that instruction. MARS places enforcement outside the agent's reasoning, where the agent cannot reinterpret or override the policy decision.

Each layer addresses a different control point. Authentication establishes agent identity, content sanitization protects what the agent consumes, model safeguards evaluate instructions, and DLP governs sensitive data in motion. Defense in depth comes from combining those roles rather than expecting one control to cover the full attack chain.

DEFENSE IN DEPTH ACROSS THE AGENT WORKFLOW

1. **Agent Authentication:** Unauthenticated agents are denied access, while approved agents can be individually identified and attributed.
2. **Per-Agent Policy Guardrails:** Each agent reaches only the sites, categories, applications, and resources permitted for its role.
3. **Web Threat Protection:** HEAT Shield and DOM analysis identify and neutralize evasive or malicious web content before it reaches the agent.
4. **Prompt-Injection Defense Through Content Sanitization:** Content Disarm and Reconstruction removes hidden or unsafe elements from files before ingestion.
5. **Prompt-Injection Detection:** Specialized model analysis examines the remaining content for adversarial instructions and attempts to redirect the agent.
6. **LLM-Level Safeguards:** The model provider's guardrails add another layer to identify or reject unsafe instructions.
7. **Adaptive DLP:** Sensitive data can be identified, masked, or prevented from leaving during the workflow.

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Enforce Consequential Decisions Outside the Model


Model-level guardrails address one trust boundary. Deterministic controls should enforce critical policy decisions independently of the agent's interpretation of whether an action is safe.

This is an application of the security principle of complete mediation: access and actions should be checked whenever they occur, not assumed safe because the agent, identity, tool, or destination was approved earlier. OWASP's agentic guidance reinforces this need by treating behavior hijacking, tool misuse, and identity and privilege abuse as related risks across the same workflow.


Identity controls resource access, application security protects the underlying systems, and model providers apply safeguards within the LLM. MARS complements those controls by governing the runtime path connecting the agent to web content and enterprise data. The combined controls can intervene before malicious content influences the agent and before unsafe behavior exposes sensitive information.



Identity Controls Resource Access



Application Security Protects Systems



Model Providers Safeguard the LLM



MARS Governs the Runtime Path

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MENLO AGENT RUNTIME SECURITY (MARS)

How Menlo Neutralizes the Agentic Attack Surface

MARS addresses both sides of enterprise AI use. For employees, it provides visibility and policy controls around AI chat services, browser sidebars, and AI capabilities embedded in SaaS applications. For autonomous and semi-autonomous agents, it applies runtime controls to the web content, files, data, and destinations involved in their work.

For agent activity, MARS reduces exposure to hostile input, governs access, protects data in motion, and preserves human control over consequential actions.

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Menlo Agent Runtime Security (MARS)

Neutralize Malicious Input

MARS inspects web content and page structure for evasive behavior, hidden elements, and indirect prompt-injection attempts before the material reaches the agent.

Files receive an additional layer of protection through Content Disarm and Reconstruction. CDR transfers verified content to a clean structure while leaving unsafe or unrecognized objects behind, allowing the agent to use legitimate information without consuming hidden malware or malicious instructions.

The same inspection applies to files retrieved from internal repositories or prepared for retrieval-augmented generation. MARS evaluates that content before ingestion, reducing the opportunity for poisoned material to enter an agent's context or persist within a knowledge base.

Govern Web Interactions

Removing malicious content addresses only part of the risk. Organizations must also control which agents can access the web, where they may go, and how they interact with the resources they find.

MARS authenticates agents before granting internet access and applies policies to each agent rather than treating all agents alike. A research agent may be allowed to visit a broad set of informational sites, while an agent handling financial or customer data may operate within a much narrower boundary. Policy can account for the agent's identity, assigned role, destination, site category, and permitted workflow.

Known malicious and prohibited destinations can be kept entirely outside the workflow. When a destination is useful but uncertain, MARS can provide controlled access, separating the content from the agent environment. This avoids forcing organizations into a blunt choice between unrestricted access and blocking every unfamiliar site.

Individual attribution also gives security teams a clearer operational record. They can determine which agent accessed a resource, which policy applied, and what interaction followed. That context supports more precise investigations and allows policies to be adjusted based on actual agent behavior rather than on broad assumptions about automated traffic.



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Menlo Agent Runtime Security (MARS)

Protect Sensitive Information

Even when an agent reaches an approved destination, the data involved in the interaction may not be appropriate to share. MARS therefore examines information moving into and out of agent workflows, including text, files, uploads, downloads, and outbound requests.

Policies can identify regulated or sensitive information such as personal data, healthcare records, payment information, credentials, and proprietary business content. When an agent needs the structure or context of that information but not the underlying values, MARS can mask the protected data before it reaches an external model or destination. The agent can continue the workflow using anonymized content without unnecessarily disclosing the original information.

Where masking would not provide sufficient protection, the policy can prevent the transfer entirely. Upload and download controls provide similar governance for files moving through the workflow, combining data inspection with file sanitization where required.

Maintain Operational Control

Operational control requires visibility into agent activity and the ability to intervene. MARS records and attributes that activity so organizations can understand what their agents accessed, which controls were applied, and where policy affected the workflow.

Policies can also preserve human involvement where the consequences warrant it. Routine, reversible actions may proceed within established guardrails. Higher-impact actions can require approval, while suspicious or unexpected activity can trigger human takeover or termination of the session. The level of oversight can reflect the sensitivity and reversibility of the proposed action, rather than applying the same level of friction to every decision.

This keeps enforcement independent of the agent's own reasoning. The agent cannot redefine the policy, decide that an exception is convenient, or approve an action simply because it appears consistent with its manipulated objective. Deterministic controls establish the boundary, while human reviewers retain authority over decisions that should not be left entirely to automation.



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
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Menlo Security Gives Agents Room to Act without Trusting Everything They Encounter

The ability to act is what separates an agent from a conventional AI assistant. Agents create value by gathering information, using tools, accessing business systems, and completing work on a user's behalf. Useful autonomy, however, requires bounded trust.

OWASP has documented the underlying risks, while Microsoft and Mandiant have demonstrated working attack chains in which hidden instructions redirect agents, legitimate tools execute manipulated intent, and authorized access becomes a path for data exposure.

MARS governs the runtime conditions under which agents act. It inspects the content they consume, controls the destinations and resources they can access, protects data moving through their workflows, and preserves human authority over consequential decisions. Organizations can retain useful agent autonomy without extending unconditional trust to every page, document, tool, or destination the agent encounters.



The agentic attack surface emerges wherever untrusted content, enterprise authority, sensitive data, and autonomous action meet. That intersection is where security now has to operate.

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The Risk and the MARS Solution

AT A GLANCE

THE RISK	THE MARS SOLUTION
Poisoned Content In	**MARS** identifies and strips indirect prompt injection laden within web content.
Poisoned Data at Rest	**MARS** sanitizes files at rest before any RAG ingest takes place.
Malicious Files & Code	**MARS** sanitizes files in real-time, blocking file-borne threats while leaving full functionality.
Sensitive Data Exposure	**MARS** discovers, masks, and controls the data leaving over the web.
Identity & Excess Access	**MARS** authenticates agents, enables least-privilege access, and provides human-in-the-loop capabilities.

Seeing Is Believing.

Learn how MARS can deliver peace of mind to the users engaging with AI agents and the enterprises that rely on them.

Book Your MARS Demo

Menlo Security is the pioneer of unified browser security, protecting the modern enterprise's dual workforce: humans and AI agents. These key capabilities are tailored for the security and access needs of users and agents, within a unified control, visibility, and policy framework. Menlo doesn't just bundle security features; we collapse the distance between security, productivity, and innovation. menlosecurity.com

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